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Introduction
The concept of subjective right is one of the fundamentals upon which die 
general doctrine of the legal systems of the civil law family is build. This idea 
is at least that much (if not in a larger scale) determining for the common law 
general doctrine as well1.
* For the work on this paper the author has received financial help from “The Scientific Research 
Fund“ at University of Plovdiv “Paisii Hilcndarski”.
11 End it necessary for some essential remarks to be leads here. I consider them vital in the con­
text of die ambiguities which the great deal of the concepts within this theme are apt to. The 
difficulties about the exact rendering of the meaning of the relevant conceptions are not only 
due to the linguistic differences (mainly between the English and the other languages), but 
also to the different: cultural and legal traditions between the common law and the civil law 
legal systems. Although this major problem could not be discussed within such a presentation
I think its important to point out that it could be possible to make use of the terms objective 
right and subjective right as closest notional alternatives to the words low and right, respeetivdy. 
However, this is not what my primary aim would be here. Actually, when I use the term objec­
tive right I will seek to designate not just the law, but rather something that is objectively right. 
Such a stipulation should be also made about the usage of the term subjective right, by which 
I’ll try not to express the notion of a single legal capacity, but rather the Idea about its rightness 
from an objective point of view.
Besides this, in the particular case, as well as further in the text, I mean only the capacity, and 
not the obligation, which could be expected if the term subjective right had been used in an 
isolation and in the civil law tradition only. So In spite of the fact that, the whole presentation 
is conformed basically with the established propositions o f the civil law legal doctrine, it could 
be misleading for cue if he or she adopts a view where the whole theme is closed within the 
framework of die problems concerning the logical natur« or the forms of subjective rights. 
On the contrary — my primary aim here is to present the philosophical basis of the idea that 
prompts the existence of a personal, an objectively right and a legally valid capacity, which 
could be related to a particular legal subject. In the civil law tradition this idea is usually ex­
pressed by the usage of the term subjective right and in the common law tradition -  simply by 
the usage of the term right (often used in plural — “rights”).
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The next lines are motivated by the desire to reveal the general philosophi­
cal genesis of the notion of subjective right as an inviolable personal belong­
ing. In the first section of the text 111 propose a thesis according to which 
todays concept of subjective right should be conceived of as a result of the 
process of deposing a certain ancient ideology, which for a long time backed 
up the idea that law had a monistic and a superhuman character. As a final 
consequence of this process we now face two separate but equally valuable 
positions concerning laws philosophical nature. One of them reflects the 
society’s point of view and one -  the individuals point of view. In the subse­
quent sections I’ll try to demonstrate and prove this thesis mainly by using 
chronological and historical approaches. In the course of the presentation I’ll 
refer to the core elements of the Christian ideology and the ideas of the En­
lightenment to reach at the end Kants philosophy, which I consider the real 
theoretical base of the contemporary concept of subjective right.
The N otions o f Objective R ight and Subjective R ight D uring  
the A ntiquity and in the M odem  Time
One of the main methodological approaches in the continental legal theory 
refers to the dichotomy between objective right and subjective right. The defi­
nition “objective right” is frequendy related to the idea by which the law is 
conceived of as something that is objectively right and principally valid to­
wards anyone. Alternatively, the construction “subjective right” is presented 
as an implication of an understanding for a specific capacity that is valid only 
towards particular subject of right. Although by offering this dichotomy the 
scholars usually aim to show two different beings of the law, they actually 
never try to oppose them one against another, because the collision between 
them would have seen inappropriate. So the efforts like those in most cases 
seem to be driven by the desire for overcoming the linguistic ambiguities that 
most of (if not all of) the “continental languages” are apt to and the manifest­
ing the logical bond between the legal norms and particular legal subjects. 
Presentations like this however, are based predominantly on the idea about 
the correlative interrelationship and logical consistency between the terms 
“objective right* and “subjective right*. They never take into account the 
causes that actually lead us to such a view or inflict the necessity to refer to 
such a dualistic model of reasoning.
Within the common law doctrine this problem does not exist with such 
pungency, which is at least partly due to the specifications of the English lan­
guage. In contrast to the languages used primarily in the civil law world the
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English has two different words, by which one could define the idea about 
a correct rule of conduct -  law and right. The first one is sometimes trans­
lated into the “continental languages” as objective right and the second one 
— as subjective right1. But to be thorough enough I have to point out that the 
word law is actually closer in meaning to the term positive law rather to the 
term objective right or even more strange term objective law. The word right 
on the other hand except as a noun, meaning a capacity, can equally serve 
as an adjective were it will mean something that is rightly from an objective 
point of view.
It is clear now however, that the issues relevant to the problem of legal du­
alism could be both put in the context of the civil law and the common law 
legal doctrines. The main reason why this could be the case, may be reduced 
in turn to a proposition, according to which that in spite of some consider­
able linguistic specifications, from an ontological as well as from a method­
ological point of view the concept o f right (either objective or subjective) is equal 
to the concept o f rightness1. So no matter how we will name our ideas about 
the correctness of our point of view (law, right, objective or subjective right) 
they should be in all cases in compliance with the actual criteria by which we 
could define any behavior as being right or wrong from an objective point of 
view. 'These criteria, which I’ll call criteria o f rightness, are of great importance 
in terms of our understanding about when an idea, that claims a realization 
of a certain conduct could be called a right. These criteria namely lay at the 
base of our understanding about the dualistic character of law and they actu­
ally made us qualify it as objective or subjective. But this major division of 
our days had no importance whatsoever for an ancient person.
Todays notion in terms of the standards by which a certain conduct of 
a human being could be qualified as objectively right relates to the concern 
about the prosperity of the whole society on the one hand and the indi­
viduals well-being on the other. This in turn provokes one general require­
ment, which demands when a certain conduct is estimated that both points 
of view -  that of the society and that of the particular individual — should 
be taken into account. In the antiquity however, the second conception was 
absolutely unacceptable. The foundations of the objectively right conduct 
(the objective right) was seen as completely monistic, no matter of whether
5 For more on this question refer to: E. Pattaro, The Law and the Right: 'Ike Reappraisal o f the 
Reality that Ought to he, Springer 2007.
3 That is why it is not possible to call something law (objective right) if it s not right form an 
objective point of view, i.e. it is not objectively right. It is quite another question that for any 
actual determination of anything as objectively right we will need a dear and specific criterion 
to refer to.
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they were sought in the mythical and the divine (dike) or in the harmony of 
the nature {ius naturale). The individual person under those circumstances 
was not able to claim any kind of subjective right simply because such a thing 
did not existed at all4. In this sense it will be reasonable to be stated that the 
modem concept of “subjective right” is a product of a “methodological twist” 
in the course of the evolution of the legal-philosophical ideas regarding the 
nature of law. This means that the real difference between the Greek dike or 
the Roman ius on the one hand and the English right or the Continental 
subjective right on the other hand, lies primarily in the different conceptions 
about what could be regarded as objectively correct standard for the accomplish­
ing a right conduct
O f course I have to point out that, the individuals in the Antiquity were 
not completely devoid of the possibility to perform a certain conduct that 
could be qualified as correct or right. On the contrary they too, just like 
the modern persons, had particular legal capacities to fulfill such a conduct. 
This for some serves as a sufficient reason for maintaining that those capaci­
ties were actually subjective rights5. However if we accept such a view, then 
well be compelled to specify that the holders of those “subjective rights” as it 
seems, conceived of them more like certain predefined means for accomplish­
ing some kind of “external objective right” (law) rather than something that 
they had on their own disposal. But this is actually the main philosophical 
difference, as already stated, between the ancient legal capacity and the mod­
ern notion of subjective right. I think that this circumstance is not always 
taken into account when concepts and institutions with a millennial history 
are automatically transferred to the contemporary legal doctrines.
The A ncient Philosophy o f the N atural Law  and its 
Influences on the Rom an Legal D octrine
The influences of the Ancient Greek culture in the evolution of the Roman 
Empire are unquestionable. They could be found at all levels in social life, 
but they are in particular perceivable in the realm of philosophy from where 
they penetrated into the legal doctrine of the Ancient Rome. Absolutely vital 
role in this regard is committed to the classical philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle, trough which although not explicitly Ciceros and Senecas philoso­
phies had been formed too. In each of these philosophies the natural law is
4 G. Herbert, A Philosophical History o f Rights, New Jersey 2003, p. 49.
5 F. Miller, A History o f the Philosophy o f Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics, Springer 
2007, p. 158.
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the main theme. It was presented as the only possible and objectively right 
standard for the accomplishing any human behavior.
The natural law discourse is originally introduced in the ancient philoso­
phy by Plato and after that it is taken by Aristotle and his followers so to be 
eventually carried over into the philosophical thought of the Ancien t Rome6. 
Although we could find some considerable divergences in the different phi­
losophical understandings of what the natural law is about, they are not that 
important in the context of the current presentation. On the contrary, it is 
actually the opposite stream of thought that 1 consider useful here because it 
will lead us to the common core of the natural law discourse and that should 
be of great importance for us now.
In all of its ancient varieties the natural law was always presented as an 
ultimate law of the whole universe. This law was relevantly applicable in the 
physical as well as in the social world and it was always manifested in terms 
of ideas about causality and teleology7. Human beings had the ability to choose 
but this ability was confined to the predetermined virtues of the nature.
By referring to those postulates one should be able to grasp the general 
ideological framework of the ancient world, where todays difference between 
the exploration of the physical phenomena and the cognition of the social 
processes was quite unclear. That is why in all the cases mentioned, the core 
problems did not lay down in the realm of the political or the legal philoso­
phy as the modern scholar may prefer to say, but rather they were thought 
of as part of some moral philosophy. In other words not the basic reasons 
of the political authority was sought to be found in all of these instances, 
but actually the reasons for the objectively right conduct that human beings 
needed to refer to. So the question about whether a certain rule of conduct 
was politically or morally justified didn’t have any value. Ihe human person 
was not perceived as something valuable on its own. It was subjected to the 
general and superior laws of the universe8. Onto this ideological background 
any discussion about the division between the objective and the subjective 
right was absolutely superfluous.
Tfie above mentioned understandings of the nature of the law form the 
basis of the roman legal doctrine too. Romans based their legal propositions
6 G. Herbert, op. tit., p. 19.
7 S. Terrier, Cause, the Persistence o f Teleology, and the Origins o f the Philosophy o f Social Science,
Oxford 2003, p. 21.
8 So for example, in spite of the fact that Aristotle developed a wholesome and a complete politi­
cal philosophy, based on the natural virtues, he never considered humans as equal beings. In 
Ms paradigm the natural virtues were dlfierent for the dlfierent persons and therefore anyone 
had to cojiiine to different capacities, respectively -  different rights. In such a logical stream, 
for example, was the idea of slavery reasoned. For more on this see: G. Herbert, op. cit., p, 29.
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on their practical philosophy, which they referred to as the true philosophy 
(philosophia verdf. On these grounds was also built the primary taxonomy 
in roman legal doctrine, by which the law was defined with the first order 
categories like ius naturaie, ius gentium and ius civile. None of these defini­
tions however, had any priority against the others. It was actually quite the 
opposite -  all of them were considered equal and all of them were conformed 
to the general ideas about the existence of inevitable causal determinations 
about the physical and social being of the human. This is the reason why for 
example, there could not be anything illogical in the propositions that all 
people were bom equal under the rules of ius naturaie, but some of them are 
doomed to be slaves under the rules of ius gentium10.
Christianity a s a P recursor o f a New Paradigm
The ideas that have been described above dominated in Greece and Rome for 
a considerably long period of time. With the appearance of the Christian­
ity however, they started to face strong resistance. The Christian philosophy 
offered an absolute independence for the human persons, although so in an 
intellectual form. The Christians didn’t reject the political power of the ro­
man emperor, but they also didn’t accept the divine character of his persona11. 
This new situation delivered strong blow to the view, where the belief about 
predetermined virtues still dominated.
The spread of the Christianity within the territories of the Roman Empire 
was one of the maim causes which started the fundamental ideological shift 
in he official doctrine about the nature of law (the objective right). The great 
reason about that, on its own turn, was of course due to the new philosophi­
cal ideology about the independence of the human spirit from the political 
power in the society. Although this idea never got out of the philosophi­
cal framework of the predetermination of mans being, it for the first time 
marked a clear borderline between the spiritual and the political spheres for 
the individual’s life. This provoked the liberation of the spiritual substance 
of man, which turned out to be the first condition which would bring in 
the idea that rights could be claimed as personal belongings. This condition 
however, would not be the last, because rights would have to be politically 
recognized too.
9 G. Samuel, The Foundation o f Legal Reasoning, Tilburg 1994, p. 40.
10 Ibidem,
u G. Herbert, op, cit., p. 38.
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Although the Christian ideology defended the spiritual liberty it actually 
didn’t tolerate the political independence of man. Even in its most institu­
tionalized form the Christian monotheism never undermined the political 
system of the Ancient Rome. It rather introduced the change in the belief 
about the divine as a source of authority and shifted this endowment from 
the emperors persona to the power that he exercised. That is why to be ac­
quired for real rights would have to be politically realized and eventually 
gained by the means of arms. Historically those processes had to pass the 
stages of the construction of the official doctrine of the Christian church and 
then its rejection in the name of human reason.
The Scholastic Transform ation o f  the A ncient Idea o f the 
N atural Law
St. Thomas Aquinas is usually held to be the founder of the new Natural law 
theory (the Christian theory of Natural law). His ideas are now considered 
to be a part of the evolution of the scholastic legal thought during the late 
middle ages (X3I—XIV centuries). Other major representatives of this school 
were also Duns Scot and William of Ockham. Sometimes one can hear that 
this doctrine build up the real base of the rights discourse in western legal 
philosophy. This is probably due to the fact that the scholastic quests revived 
and refined the ancient theory of Natural Law to make it suitable to the 
propositions of the medieval Christianity, which as pointed out, had already 
changed some core principles of the ancient beliefs about the laws that gov­
erned man and nature. However, the Christian philosophy never readied 
the real idea of subjective rights12. The main conccm of the scholastic schol­
ars was about the integrity of the catholic doctrine, which turned out to be 
threatened by the spread of the ancient philosophers’ writings. In this sense 
the new natural law thesis was not a thesis about the natural rights (except 
of Ockham’s ideas), but a conception offering a model of the eternal law (lex 
aetema), which was reasoned by the presence of the divine (ius divinium)13. 
This philosophical construction is closer to the ancient model of ius naturak, 
rather to the classical thesis based on the idea about the natural origin of the 
personal capacities to carry out a correct conduct, which actually grounds
12 Such a merit is sometimes ascribed to 'William of Ockham (see: F. Miller, op. ch., p. 160). Wil­
liam of Ockham did indeed reasoned on the thesis o f the natural rights (not natural law), but 
his work was entirely confined by the limits of the canonical law. The concept of subjective 
right differs from the mere belief o f the natural rights by its political nuances. Despite of that 
Ockham’s views were far ahead of his time.
13 Ц. Торбов, История m пратата наука, София 2002, p. 45.
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the political (hence, the legal) claims about rights. It seems to me clear now 
that one could not maintain the allegation that the dichotomy between the 
objective and the subjective right had been taken into account by the repre­
sentatives of the scholastic legal thought. The importance of this dichotomy 
had not been realized until Grotius’ thesis had been proposed and developed 
by his followers.
From  the N otion o f N atural Law  to the Concept o f  N atural 
R ights
Hugo Grotius first among others proposed the notion of a personal right as 
something that didn’t need a superior reliance. He deduced this idea from the 
concept of a human consciousness, which was able on its own to recognize 
the correct from the incorrect. According to Grorius the whole natural law 
was encoded Into the consciousness of man and so the standard of a right 
conduct could be reached by means of logical operations. This kind of rea­
soning was sometimes compared to the mathematical reasoning, by which 
this school received its distinctive appellation -  mos geometricus (geometrical 
method)14.
The theory of Hugo Grotius reflects the crucial evolution of the European 
civilization that developed from the XVI century onwards. The Reformation 
provoked by the crisis of the confidence in the canonical Catholicism opened 
the gates for a new social model, where the absolute authority of ius divinium 
would be put into question. From a social-political point of view this process 
would lead to the decline of the long established political balance, which in 
turn will give start to the “chain reaction” of the European bourgcois-demo- 
cratic revolutions that shaped the new social order.
The sabotage of the monistic view about the origins of the objective right 
(the law) had become possible because the idea about the autonomy of the 
human person was imposed as a sufficient condition in terms of the possibil­
ity of following an objectively right and truly correct rule of conduct. The 
right of the person was not anymore conceived of as something derivative 
but as something basic and primary on its own. The personal claims didn’t 
anymore face the necessity to be justified with whatever sort of external and 
superior source, needed for securing the objectivity and the truth of the legal 
norms. The spiritual liberation of man was now combined with his physical 
and hence -  his political liberation.
14 G. Samuel, op. cit., p. 52.
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Although that some of those propositions may seem somehow unclear, 
they actually lead us to quite opposite models of reasoning about rights. In 
the first place this new idea imposed the view that if someone has the rational 
ability to understand the natural law principles (which any person must have) 
he or she would be able to acquire both rights and duties (subsequently the 
question about their relationship would become of great importance). In the 
second place, the idea about possessing rights leads to the possibility for their 
holders to dispose of them. If we use the terminology of the Roman legal 
doctrine we could say that this new conception had coincided the categories 
ms and dominium15 (lit., virtue and disposition).
This kind of reasoning could bring to us the idea that rights can be as­
cribed to someone else or need to be restored if someone else violated them. 
In a political sense such an affiliation would justify claims against any po­
litical authority which tends to infringe any rights. This thesis mainly was 
grounded in the French “Declaration for the rights of man and citizen” and is 
now developed in the modem constitutions and all the universal and regional 
acts relevant to the human rights law16.
Although those ideas built up the bases of the intellectual changes in the 
time of modernism, most of the issues would yet to begin the initiation of 
a serious talk. It is however unquestionable now that his new attitude towards 
status of man was a major turnover in the course of the social and politi­
cal development in Europe, From a philosophical-theoretical point of view 
this conclusions led to extraordinary complications of the discussions of the 
general conceptions about law. The disintegration of the ideological model 
of the canonical society provoked a severe need for completely new criteria 
in terms of objectivity and truth. They in all eases had to be deprived of the 
mythical nature of ius divinium and the only possible solution under these 
circumstances was seen in its natural antipode — human rationality. So the 
rational examination of reality turned out to be the major priority for the 
modern science during the centuries that followed.
The D ilem m as o f  the Enlightenm ent and the New Social 
M odel
The epoch of Enlightenment is now referred to as a period of total transfor­
mation in the “civilized world”. That transformation ran at all levels of mans 
being but two were the major spheres by which the new model of society was
15 Ibidem, p. 54.
ls Ibidem, p. 55.
28 DIMITAR HANEV
actually recognized. Those were the spheres of the politics and knowledge. 
The first one demanded a solution in terms of division and exercise of politi­
cal power and through the second one such a solution had to be proposed.
Under those circumstances the new political theory faced the great chal­
lenge to substitute the core of the long-established postulates of the canonical 
doctrine and to justify the substantial parameters of a new law which had to 
serve both as a rational standard for a particular rule of conduct and as a valid 
program ensuring the right development of the whole society. The ancient 
and the medieval philosophy had never confronted with such a dilemma. 
The defenders of that philosophy extracted the notion of law (the objective 
right) from a specific idea, according to which a predetermined and a supe­
rior will existed and stood as external both towards the “biological” and the 
“social” man. By rejecting the predeterminism however, the criteria about 
what was objectively right (i.e. what was the objective right) became contro­
versial. Then the new political science fell into a situation, in which it had to 
propose an answer to an insurmountable question: What could be regarded as 
an objectively right bothfor the society and for man? The endeavors to satisfy the 
answer to this question actually led to the formation of two separate dimen­
sions about the idea of objective right — the objective right towards society 
and the objective right towards man17. The aspiration for unifying those two 
dimensions is in the core base of the political and legal order of the contem­
porary world.
From the knowledge perspective the free man of the enlightenment was 
confronted with another dilemma. The formalism of the scholastic doctrine 
was replaced by a practical empiricism and the unquestioned confidence in
17 Because in most of the European languages the meanings of those separate dimensions col­
lided in the word right (consider for example these instances: French -  droip, German -- rechi- 
Russian and Bulgarian — право), a specific explanation had to be added. That is why the terras 
objective and subjective had to be imposed in the legal-theoretical language in the next few cen­
turies, so the great demands of the new legal theory weie satisfied. And as it now wdi known 
probably the pick of this discourse could be found in the European theory of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century when the meanings of those conceptions were explored in great depth. 
Those discourses however never got out o f the monistic paradigm about law, which I tltink is 
still predominant in the continental (probably not that much in die Anglo-Saxon) doctrinal 
beliefs. According to those beliefs the objective right and subjective rights are different but 
interrelated and correlative components of one and the same thing. In English, however those 
ambiguities are not that sharp as in the other European languages. Probably this is one of the 
reasons why that kind o f legal dualism is not considered that important in the common law 
legal doctrine. The term kw  there comes from the old English and means something that is laid  
down (see E. Pattaro, op tit). This meaning is closer to the term positive law, rather than the 
term objective law. So that is why in the common kw tradition wt could find a rights discourse 
but not a subjective — objective right discourse.
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the providence by an unlimited rationalism18. This imposed an understand­
ing that anything observable could be examined and hence explained in its 
real, natural and ultimate state. This idea gave birth to a new scientific para­
digm according to which the objective world manifested itself as a mechani­
cal system, which was subject to investigation, description and realization 
by means of practical observation and rational criticism19. Within the social 
knowledge framework this conception created the idea for the natural state o f 
society, by understanding of which one would be able to reveal the true objec­
tive right (what is right from an objective point of view).
The Enlightenment dilemmas created the real rights discourse, but al­
though that it provoked an intellectual debate in all the European societies 
their historical as well as institutional specifications modified it to produced 
relatively different consequences. The Continental Europe took the course 
of a political radicalism and an ultimate rationalism. By contrast British phi­
losophy developed a practical utilitarianism, liberalism and moderate empiri­
cism. All this created considerable differences within the political and legal 
theories which in turn, reflected on the legal doctrine of the modern legal 
systems.
The R igh ts Foundations in  the Idea o f  the Social Contract
The paradigm of the natural state of society in its own turn created the whole 
new discourse in the framework of the political philosophy -  the social con­
tract discourse. This theme was thoroughly investigated both in the Anglo­
Saxon as well as in the Continental political thought. The first proponents of 
the social contract theories in England were Thomas Hobbes and John Locke 
and their successor and modifier at the continent was mainly Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau followed by Immanud Kant. In all of their instances the social con­
tract theories strived to reveal the true and initial state of man and the origins 
of his necessity to live in a society.
Both for Hobbes and Locke the social contract had to confine the unlim­
ited and egoistic aspirations of biological man. So they conceive of rights as 
negative freedoms which any person had on his disposal after the social con­
tract had been validated. This conception of rights is absolutely vital in the 
common law tradition. It was later embraced by Thomas Pain under whose
18 In the legal-philosophical discourse this dichotomy later gave birth to the debate between legal 
positivism and the new tlisoty of natural law.
13 This paradigm is now frequently seen as produced by Descartes’, Galileo’s and Newton’s theo­
ries, See: F. Beiser, The Enlightenment and Idealism, [in:] Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism, Cambridge 2006, p. 19.
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influence it had been taken into USA and built in into the American Consti­
tution20. In a certain sense the negative freedoms idea is the true alternative to 
the continental concept of subjective right.
Unlike his English antecedents Rousseau didn’t see man in an egoistic 
light. Rather he was convinced of the idea of the virtuous man. He thought 
that the natural state of man is a state of “love towards oneself” and “charity 
[towards others]”21. According to him the social contract didn’t have to be 
validated for the limitation of man’s aspirations. On the contrary -  it had to 
create the practical possibility mans virtues to be materialized. Under this 
kind of reasoning rights were seen as possibilities or means for accomplishing 
certain ends within the social prosperity. Later on in the context of codifica­
tion and within the process of the “official reception” of the roman private 
law Savigny and Iering would bring up the problem about the reasons of such 
possibilities. This is how the debate between the will theory and the interest 
theory would come into being.
From a formal perspective both the English and the Continental theories 
of social contract adopted similar approaches in terms of rights reasoning. 
When it comes to their functions however, large differences are revealing to 
us. The practicability of the English philosophical thought and the strong 
connection of the common law with the English traditions restrained the 
heavy wave of the total changes which blasted the Continental Europe during 
the Enlightenment. The Common Law didn’t need a new perspective for its 
future. It was living enough so to continue with the regulation of the social 
relations such as they were. On the contrary -  the strong influence of ius 
canonici in the continental legal systems raised a radicalism, which led to the 
necessity of overall renovation of the existing legal model. Those divergences 
in the Common Law and in the Cfvil Law discourse resulted in different 
doctrinal conceptions about rights. In the Common Law doctrine the idea 
of a right is still relevant to the idea of not-intervention in the legal subjects 
personal sphere, by which the boundaries of its freedom are marked. In the 
civil law doctrine on the other hand, the concept of a right refers to the con­
cepts such as possibility or power, which give the legal subject a capacity for 
accomplishing a certain future goal by upholding a certain affiliated interest.
30 T, Campbell, op. tit, p. 7.
31 С. Йотов, Въведент във философия на правото, София 1995, р. 58,
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K an t’s Ideas as a Philosophical B ase  o f the Theoretical 
Concept o f Subjective R ight
Kants philosophy is often presented as a “last resort” for the felling scien­
tific project of the Enlightenment. But to make it such so, Kant had to reject 
everything that his antecedents accomplished in their works and to start literary 
from the very beginning. From a political-theoretical perspective this means 
that Kant had to find completely new standards about mans natural state so 
to be able to propose a satisfying explanation of his social being. The previous 
attempts on this always failed because their outcome definitions faced the criti­
cism in terms of the validity standards about their propositions. Aware of that 
danger Kant created a strategy, by which he wanted to prevent his proposals 
from the inevitable skepticism of the modern science. In the very core of this 
strategy Kant put the idea about a constant o f the human mind, which had to 
guide him when building his moral and political philosophy.
In this way the concepts of the pure reason and the practical reason were 
invented. By the first one Kant defined the initial and the primary ability 
of human mind to percept and perceive and by the second one -  the initial 
and the primary ability of human mind to follow a certain rule of conduct. 
The real constant was the pure reason upon which a perfect and a complete 
philosophical system had been constructed. The idea of the practical reason 
however, Kant put in the core of his moral philosophy, which in turn gave the 
origins of his political philosophy.
By exploring the idea of the practical reason Kant invented another basic 
conception of his system, which he called a categorical imperative. The cat­
egorical imperative represents itself as a universal moral principle governing 
the behavior of every rational being, having a capacity to percept and per­
ceive, This behavioral standard never referred to any metaphysical ideas like 
virtue or justice. It was simply a formal criterion by which Kant proposed 
an explanation of the necessity that pushed man into his social being. The 
explanation for Kant was simple -  for to be able to live in a society man had 
to confine his free will (which was unlimited in his natural state) with others’ 
free wills. The categorical imperative gave an answer to the question why this 
free wills confinement was Inevitable. It was inevitable not because man was 
egoistic or virtuous (as Hobbes or Rousseau believed) but bccausc a practical 
necessity imposed a primary duty towards others. Such a duty according to 
Kant formed the core base in every single society.
I think it is clear now that in the very base of his moral, hence politi­
cal philosophy Kant grounded the concept of a duty. This concept actually
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made it possible any other substantive relations between men to be further 
reasoned. This is especially of great importance when it comes to the idea 
about rights.
As probably already noticed Kant gave a, great weight in his philosophy 
to the idea o f free will. The limitation of the free will is actually what made 
m an a social being. The sate of the unlimited will however, also had a certain 
definition and this definition was freedom.
The idea of freedom similarly to the free will idea had a great importance 
in Kants philosophical system. It actually had two relatively different dis­
courses there. The first one qualified it as an opposite of the limited will of 
the presocial man and the other one — as a certain and an affiliated capacity 
within the political union that had been already constructed my means of 
the categorical imperative22. That second dimension of freedom is however 
essential in the context of the rights discourse. Just like most of the other 
ideas in Kants philosophy the idea of freedom had a formal nature too. Kant 
defined it as a  limitation o f the possibility to be bound by someone else‘s choice 
This simple definition is probably the best representation of an idea that gave 
birth to a whole set of theories striving to explain the substantial character of 
mans political -  hence legal freedom. That understanding became an elegant 
theoretical base for the modem concept of subjective right.
The concept of subjective right still takes a considerable part in present day 
legal philosophy. This unfading interest had been mainly modified by Im­
manuel Kant’s philosophy. But although his elegant ideas refined most of the 
findings of his antecedents they never got out from the conceptual framework 
of rationalism which main focus had always been on the reasoning of the ex­
ternal world trough the idea of the natural state of the mind. By following 
this fascinating idea the political theories of the Enlightenment created the 
natural rights movement, which main proponents put all of their efforts to 
impose an understanding of the law (the objective right) as a human creation. 
In that great endeavor they unquestionably succeeded. The rationalism of the 
Enlightenment liberated man from the idea of the predeterminism. By that 
however it never satisfied the problem of the practical standards to allow an 
objective but external estimation of a human behavior. So the rational project
21 F. Rauscher, Social and Political Philosophy, [in:] Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, www.plato. 
stanibrd.edu/en.tries/kant-sodal-political.
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of the enlightenment failed to satisfy the practical requirements of a possible 
political model. Ibis is the main reason why the positivism succeeded in the 
next stage of the evolution of the European social and political ideas.
A bstrakt
Filozoficzne źródła koncepcji praw a podm iotowego
Pojęcie prawa podmiotowego jest jednym a fundamentów, na których powstała ogólna 
nauka o systemach prawnych prawa cywilnego. Na początku postawiono tezę, że dzi­
siejsza. koncepcja prawa podmiotowego powinna być pojmowana jako wynik procesu. 
W końcowym etapie tego procesu należy porównać dwie koncepcje filozoficznej natury 
prawniczej. Pierwsza odzwierciedla punkt widzenia społeczeństwa, a druga — indywi­
dualny. W rozważaniach wzięto pod uwagę podstawowe elementy ideologii chrześci­
jańskiej, idee oświecenia oraz koncepcję I. Kanta, które uznano za prawdziwą podstawę 
współczesnej koncepcji prawa podmiotowego.
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